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“Constitutionalism In Africa: Creating Opportunities, Facing Challenges” (2001), 
Oloka-Onyango, J., ed., Notes, refs, index, xi, 345pp, UGANDA. FOUNTAIN 
PUBLISHERS  
 
This extraordinary edited book of words, style, illustrations and arguments provides a 
relevant insight into African constitutionalism from the past until the present, with 
projections into the future. The success of this book is, in fact, in the scholarly and 
editorial ingenuity of both the contributors and the editor. Oloka-Onyango combines 
creative authors who use law, gender, literature, pan-Africanism, language, politics, 
religion and ethnicity as disciplinary arenas of examination. The book is about re-
writing African constitutions and constitutionalism in ways that reflect African people 
power. Whether by reverting to oral constitutionalism of African traditional societies as 
Antonia Kalu suggests, or introducing positive discrimination quota systems for 
affirmative action as Sylvia Tamale suggests, all the authors seem to agree that the 
phenomenon of executive prerogatives and excess cannot continue unchecked by law 
and principle. 
 
Constitutionalism defined. Kalu sees constitutionalism as the carefully crafted 
relationship between recognizable national ideas and the day-to-day practice of 
citizenship. She cautions against neo-colonial constitutionalism in Africa by continual 
use of “Western classrooms” models introduced in the colonial era. Likewise, several 
chapters acknowledge that many African governments and the drafters of various 
constitutions have manipulated the instruments in order to deny people their rights and 
freedoms. Analyses in all the chapters of the book reveal beyond doubt that the human 
rights schemes in various constitutions examined discriminate against both men and 
women and put undesirable restrictions on rights granted to people in international 
human rights documents. Particularly beyond that, there is a fair agreement that in the 
formulation of African constitutions, women face the plight of the larger half; they face 
limitations on their sexual orientation (Mazrui, Chapter 1), ethnicity (Gahamanyi-
Mbaye, Chapter 5), indigenous citizenship (Tajudeen, Chapter 4), religious freedoms 
(Ola Aboa Zeid, Chapter 10), and they are socially and economically under-privileged 
(Tamale, Chapter 12). 
 
Another observation is that neutrality in human rights is not guaranteed in African 
constitution formulation. In some cases, reservations have been made to various articles 
and principles of international law and human rights principles in the belief that the 
articles violate inter alia, traditional cultural rights, the teachings of Shari’a, human 
dignity, and established supposedly “moral,” sexual behavior and African custom. For 
example, Article 1(a) of the Cairo Declaration recognizes that all human beings are 
equal, albeit in human dignity not ‘rights’ (Zeid). The question, which then arises, is 
what is African and what is Western, and how can we be “African” without appearing 
to deny rights that are inherent? Is it possible to develop an African constitutionalism 
when Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa, is interpretively working with ‘Westernized’ 
law models that  conflict with the Arab and African interpretation and practice of Shari'a 
law? Is it fair to argue that international law is indeed originally European law and to a 
large extent continues to be since no Islamic, African states were involved in its 
formulation? For example the introduction of ‘Temporary Protection’ in International 
Refugee Law is a justification of Western international law, not applicable to existing 
refugee situations on the African continent. If African feminists argue that international 
law was not originally neutral to women’s concern, do they recognize this also in other 
parts of international law? 
 
Most of the contributors to the anthology acknowledge that in the advancements of the 
women’s movement, constitutional provisions in many parts of Africa are still 
essentially masculinist. Tamale (Chapter 12) expounds on the affirmative action strategy 
introduced in Uganda to boost women’s political, social and educational achievements. 
Due to masculinist meritocracy, social privilege, and notions of African 
communitarianism, affirmative action has not translated well into women 
empowerment. She argues for positive discrimination such as affording education for all 
girls at primary and secondary education as a model affirmative action. Additionally, 
many women run the high risk of losing citizenship in Africa, since most marriages are 
patriarchal (Tajudeen, Chapter 4), patrilocal (Pereira, Chapter 9), or patriligious (Zeid, 
Chapter 10). Pereira recounts a situation where in Nigeria married women who move to 
their marital states lose indigenous citizenship in both their father’s indigenous states 
and their marital states.  
In Chapter 1, Mazrui tables the issue of sexual orientation, which is indeed controversial 
to Muslim Africa and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. He argues that African constitutions 
have not been well formulated to serve the interests of the people instead; political 
leaders and cultural institutions have engineered notions of “acceptable sexual 
behavior”. Ali Mazrui points out that in many African states, such as President Moi’s 
Kenya, President Museveni’s Uganda and President Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, individual 
offences against economic and political order are more tolerated than individual sexual 
offences.  Homosexuals for example, are denied a place in some African constitutions. 
Conclusively, people-centered constitutions should limit state power in the African 
individual private life.  
 
Another issue explored is the negotiation of  religious differences in constitutional 
making tomorrow to guarantee protection of African people and their religious 
preferences. In Chapter 10, Oba Zeid challenges the state-inspired interpretation of 
human rights principles using grassroots public opinion and action. Using the example 
of Muslim Africa, activities of liberal Muslims and public opinion should be encouraged 
to negotiate existing schemes to protect people of other religious beliefs and women 
from state inspired interpretations of international law.  
 
A couple of arguments made by the contributors are discomforting. For example, Kalu 
in Chapter 3 makes the argument that ancestral constitutionalism is only unique to 
Africa and not in the United States and Eastern Europe. In contrast, Native Americans 
had ancestral constitutions before colonialism that the tribes have maintained through 
meticulous oral history guaranteeing them rights of self-government, freedom of choice 
and expression within their own territories. Peter Mukidi Walubiri’s argument that 
constitutionalism is a process of state empowering the people, contradicts the reality that 
people empower the state and this should be the precedent. Ola Zeid, (Chapter 10) 
seems to infer that restrictions in Shari’a laws are unique in comparison to other laws in 
Africa. Yet, in “Christian Africa”, such restrictions occur in laws inter alia, relating to 
terrorism, the media, political association, gender and asylum. Zeid also dwells on 
married Muslim women but fails to demonstrate what Shari’a law provides for single 
Muslim women and female youths. 
 
This book is written entirely by Africans working on the continent and Africa Diaspora. 
Though the authors are primarily scholars, this is not your typical scholarly piece. It is 
therefore good forage for activists, researchers, civil society, judiciary, legislators and all 
pan-africanists.  Unlike other scholarly writings on Africa published and accessible only 
in “Western” libraries, this book is published and available in Kampala, Uganda. It 
captures so eloquently the ongoing constitutional debate in Africa. If you know the 
authors, this book makes you feel like you are in fact having a one-to-one conversation 
and if you do not, you will be glad you found them.  
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